This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin's (1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin's dominance solvability concept to this class of "multicriteria" games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in this class of games.
Introduction
This paper studies dominance solvability in multicriteria games, i.e. games in which the players' payoffs are generally multidimensional or vector-valued. Such higher payoff dimensionality may be relevant, for example, when modelling firms that compete in prices for profits as well as market share (Bade, 2005; Mármol et al., 2017) or in quantities under demand uncertainty (Caraballo et al., 2015) . It is also relevant in the analysis of commons exploitation when players have equity considerations in addition to a payoff capturing their personal gains (Lejano and Ingram, 2012) . Other potential domains of application of such games are multi-product auctions, multi-issue voting and bargaining among altruistic players. The paper's main motivation for studying dominance solvability in the general class of multicriteria comes from noting that, owing to the often severe multiplicity of generalized Nash equilibria (Shapley, 1959) in such games, there appears to be a need for solution concepts that offer plausible equilibrium refinements. Such refinements would allow for increased predictive sharpness and, possibly, descriptive relevance within the context of this modelling apparatus, and might help towards making multicriteria games more "friendly" for strategic economic analysis. A reasonable starting point in this endeavour is to turn to the influential notion of sophisticated equilibrium that was introduced in Moulin (1979 Moulin ( , 1986 for standard real-payoff games. In that context, dominance solvability can lead the analyst to discard equilibria in which some player employs a strategy that is iteratively weakly dominated. Similar to Moulin's work, the goal of this paper is to provide a solution concept that builds on a notion of generalized weak dominance which, whenever applicable, eliminates generalized equilibria in which some player's strategy is iteratively dominated.
To this end, the most direct generalization of weakly dominated strategies in the class of multicriteria games is considered first, requiring one strategy to dominate another for some player if it results in a weakly greater vector payoff against all opponent profiles and strictly so against some such profile. A notion of iterative dominance solvability that builds on this definition is then introduced, generalizing Moulin's (1979) notion to the present environment. The paper's main result is that finite multicriteria games that are dominance solvable in this sense are necessarily generalized equilibria. As such, it includes the main result in Moulin (1979) as a special case where all players' payoffs are real-valued.
A less demanding solution concept of iterative dominance that is based on the more general notion of partially dominated strategies is introduced next. A strategy is said to be partially dominated by another for some player if there is no opponent strategy profile at which the former does better (in the vector-dominance sense) and at the same time there is some such profile where the latter does better. This can be thought of as a "reason-based" decision rule (see also Gerasimou (2016) for a related choice-theoretic analysis) that a possibly bounded-rational player in such an environment might employ to make strategic choices. It is shown by example, however, that, when applicable, the solution concept associated with this notion of dominance may fail to select a set of generalized equilibria. 1 2
Multicriteria Games and Generalized Equilibria
A multicriteria game is a collection (
, where I is the number of players, S i is player i's pure strategy set, S = I i=1 S i is the set of all strategy profiles, and v i : S → R n i is player i's payoff function, with n i ≥ 1 holding for every i ≤ I. It will be assumed that players, strategies and payoff dimensionalities are all finite. Such a multicriteria game will therefore be referred to as finite.
For s, s ∈ S and i ≤ I, the following notation will be used:
As is standard in this literature (Zhao (2018) is a recent survey), it is assumed throughout that all players' payoffs are ordered as in (1), and that this is common knowledge. Such an assumption is obviously suitable when the modeller knows that all players' true preferences do actually coincide with the canonical partial ordering on the Euclidean space that pertains to their payoffs (intuitively, when they are unable to resolve trade-offs across their different payoff dimensions) and this fact is commonly known in the game. Moreover, as pointed out in Bade (2005) , the assumption is also relevant when the modeller is actually ignorant about the players' true (and possibly complete) preferences. In this case, employing the vector-dominance partial ordering (and allowing in principle for the possibility that the associated partial preferences may be completed in player-specific ways) ensures that no plausible preference profiles are a priori ruled out.
A strategy profile s ∈ S in a multicriteria game is a (pure-strategy) generalized Nash equilibrium if, for all i ≤ I,
If s is a generalized equilibrium, then a unilateral deviation by some player that results in a gain in some payoff dimension also results in a loss in some other dimension. When n i = 1 for all i this definition reduces to that of ordinary pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Focusing on zero-sum, two-person multicriteria games, Shapley (1959) was the first to analyze the above solution concept, which is sometimes referred to as Pareto equilibrium in the literature (Voorneveld, Vermeulen, and Borm, 1999) . Also focusing on this class of games, Blackwell (1956) studied the minimax solution. An important result that goes back to Shapley (1959) is that if the players' vector payoffs are "scalarized" by means of a suitable, player-specific vector of convex weights that are attached in a consistent manner to each player's payoff dimensions, then every generalized Nash equilibrium of the game can be obtained as the possibly unique equilibrium of the corresponding scalarized game under some set of scalarization weights for all players.
Weak Dominance Solvability as an Equilibrium Refinement
Given a multicriteria game (S i , v i ) I i=1 , a strategy s i of player i will be said to weakly dominate
This obviously coincides with the standard definition of weak dominance whenever n i = 1. For S ⊆ S, let U (S ) denote the set of strategy profiles s ∈ S such that s i is not weakly dominated for any player i ≤ I. It will then be said that a multicriteria game is weakly dominance solvable if there exist
U (S k ) = S k and, for every player i and all
The above definition encompasses that of dominance solvability in the sense of Moulin (1979) as a special case when n i = 1 for all i ≤ I. Moreover, as in Moulin (1979) , the dominated strategies of all players are eliminated in each round. As is well-known, this assumption is not without loss of generality. Contrary to what happens when payoffs are real-valued, however, in general situations where a multicriteria game is weakly dominance solvable the players' payoff functions are not required to be constant at the solution set. Intuitively, when payoffs are real-valued the players' indifference between two strategies conditional on an opponent strategy profile is captured by equality of their payoffs. When the latter are multidimensional, the proposed notion of weak dominance solvability effectively extends the definition of indifference to vector equality or incomparability according to the canonical partial ordering in Euclidean space.
The set of pure-strategy generalized Nash equilibria of a multicriteria game will be denoted by N (S). If such a game is weakly dominance solvable, its solution set will be denoted by D w (S).
Proposition 1
If a finite multicriteria game is weakly dominance solvable, then D w (S) ⊆ N (S).
Proof.
Suppose S is weakly dominance solvable. Let S ⊆ S and assume to the contrary that there is s ∈ S such that s ∈ N (U ( S)) and s ∈ N ( S). Then, for some player i and strategy
Since s i ∈ S i \ U i ( S i ), there exists s i ∈ S i that weakly dominates s i in S. In particular,
It follows from (4) and (5) that
Since s ∈ N (U ( S)), (6) implies s i ∈ S i \ U i ( S i ). Therefore, s i is also weakly dominated in S by another strategy s i ∈ S i which, in view of the above, is such that s i ∈ U i ( S i ) too. Upon applying this 3 argument recursively and recalling that S i is finite one concludes that there exists s *
From (4) and also from the definitions of s * * i , s i we get
This implies
which contradicts (9). Therefore, it holds that
Now, since the game is weakly dominance solvable, there exist S 1 , . . . , S k such that S = S 1 , S j+1 = U (S j ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and 
Since N (U ( S)) ⊆ N ( S) for all S ⊆ S and S j+1 = U (S j ), it follows from (10) and (11) that
dominated by D. In the second round, A is removed as partially dominated by D. In the third round, M is removed as partially dominated by U , while in the final round, D is removed as dominated by B. The unique partial-dominance solution is therefore (U, B), at which profile the row player profitably deviates to D.
